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PERSONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN INDIA AND ISRAEL

Marc Galanterand Jayanth Krishnan*

Although India and Israel differ dramatically in size, population, and
affluence, there are many important similarities. Each is the contemporary vehicle of an old and resilient civilization that expresses a
distinctive, influential and enduring arrangement of the various facets
of human experience. Each of these cultures underwent a prolonged
colonial experience in which its traditions were disrupted and subordinated to a hegemonic European Christian culture;' each had an earlier
experience with victorious, expansive Islam; 2 each has reached an uneasy but flourishing accommodation with the secular, scientific moder3
nity of the West.
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Stanley Wolpert, A New History of India (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997) 14986; Arian, The Second Republic, supra n. 1, at 23; John L. Esposito, Islam and Politics
(Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1991).
For an old but still relevant book on modernity in India, see Lloyd Rudolph, Modernity of Tradition (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1967); also see S.P. Gupta,
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In each case this was achieved by a movement that embraced "Enlightenment" values and in turn provoked a recoil from modernity/
rediscovery of tradition. 4 In each there is a conflict between those with
"modern" secular views of civil society and those revivalists or fundamentalists who seek to restore an indigenous religiously based society.
The secular nationalism that predominated in the struggle for independence and the formation of the state is now countered by powerful
tides of fundamentalism.,
In the course of their long histories Hindu and Jewish cultures had
some contact, but each had been largely peripheral to the other; they
were not the major presences in each other's arenas, but at most bit
players. But now in the new "global" setting at the opening of the third
millennium of the common era, there is a proliferation of new connections. Each has successfully absorbed elements of the culture of the
Christian west, which has supplied the idiom of intensified global
communications. Each is a major participant in the global scholarly/
intellectual exchange. Each has regained a political dimension and is
now "represented" in the international arena by a state situated at the
contested frontiers of Islamic militancy.
6
India and Israel are both new nations with multi-ethnic populations.
Each emerged as a nation state in the first wave of de-colonization
through a partition process that reduced the presence of its largest
7
minority and increased the preponderance of its largest religious group.
Each has a Westminster-style parliamentary system - frequently popu-

4

5

6
7

For a discussion of the Haskalah, see Jacob Katz, ed., Toward Modernity: The
EuropeanJewish Model (New Brunswick, Transaction Books, 1987); Saul Goodman,
ed., The Faith of Secular Jews (New York, Ktav Press, 1976). For a discussion on
the Hindu renaissance and a literature review of important writers in this area, see
David Miller, "Modernity in Hindu Monasticism" (1999) 34 J. Asian and African
Studies 111-26.
Paul R. Brass, Riots and Pogroms (New York, New York University Press, 1996);
David Landau, Piety and Power: The World of Jewish Fundamentalism (New York,
Hill and Wang, 1993); Laurence Silberstein, ed., Jewish Fundamentalismin Comparative Perspective (New York, New York University Press, 1993).
Sunil Khilnani, The Idea of India (London, Hamish Hamilton, 1997) 194-95; Arian,
The Second Republic: Politics in Israel, supra n. 1, at 28-41.
Wolpert, A New HistoryofIndia, supra n. 2, at 347-49; Arian, Second Republic, supra
n. 1, at 24-27.
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lated by a fragmented coalition government." Each has a legal system
based on the British common law model (with an admixture of American-style constitutionalism - more in India, less in Israel) with many
lawyers and strong higher courts that are major players in conflicts
about the most fiercely controverted policy issues.9 Although they differ
in many particulars, these courts share broad, original jurisdiction in
cases involving state action, a fascination with American law, and a
practice of forthright activism. Each has a legal system that incorporates in truncated form traditions of all-encompassing sacred law that,
in their earlier forms at least, aspired to achieve both holiness and
spiritual progress. 10 These truncated systems of sacred law are present
as "personal law". In both India and Israel, the presence of these
personal laws raises the question of reconciling its distinctive religious
legacy with a convergent world of "universal" rights. Specifically, it
involves reconciling claims for group integrity with claims for individual
fulfillment and gender equality.
In this paper, we compare the way that the administration of personal law systems reflects and shapes the social identities of religious
communities within India and Israel. 1 We also compare the way that

8

9
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Atul Kohli, "India", in Mark Kesselman, Joel Krieger and William Joseph, eds.,
Comparative Politicsat the Crossroads(Lexington, D.C. Heath, 1996) 472-73; Samuel
Krislov, "Israel", in W. Philips Shively, ed., Comparative Governance (New York,
McGraw-Hill, 1997) 328; Deborah Sontag, "Barak Creates Wide Coalition with 7
Parties", in The New York Times (internet edition), July 1, 1999.
Charles R. Epp, The Rights Revolution: Lawyers, Activists and Supreme Courts in
ComparativePerspective(Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1998) 71-89; Granville
Austin, The Indian Constitution: Cornerstoneof a Nation (Oxford, Clarendon Press,
1966) 164-84 ; H.E. Baker, The Legal System of Israel (Jerusalem, Israel University
Press, 1967) 197-207, 232-43; Martin Edelman, Courts, Politics,and Culture in Israel
(Charlottesville, University of Virginia Press, 1994) 46.
J.D.M. Derrett, Essays in Classical and Modern Hindu Law (Leiden, Brill, vol. 4,
1978) 18-20; Izhak Englard, Religious Law in the IsraeliLegal System (Jerusalem,
Hebrew University, 1975) 33-46.
Furthermore, comparing India and Israel is important for methodological reasons.
Both countries possess variation along the key independent variable in this study personal law systems. If we are to determine whether or not personal law systems
matter, then we need to study cases where personal law systems differ, not where
they are similar. Using India and Israel for our study provides an opportunity to test
the importance of this variable.
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these personal law regimes affect the roles, rights and burdens of
women. We examine the evolution of personal law systems in India and
Israel, and we focus on the way that these systems affect the religious
12
and ethnic communities that they regulate.
By systems or regimes of personal law we refer to legal arrangements
for the application within a single polity of several bodies of law to

12

For the most part, we focus on how personal laws affect the major religious community in each country: the Hindu community in India and the Jewish community in
Israel. Because of the way the personal law system in India is structured, we see
significant conflict between Hindus and Muslims. Hence, we devote some time to
discussing how personal law in India affects not only the Indian Hindu community
but also the Indian Muslim community. In Israel, because there is not the same
degree of conflict between the various religious communities over issues involving
personal status, we focus only on the country's majority Jewish population. The
recognized minority religious communities in Israel are granted great autonomy to
administer personal law matters. For example, the largest religious minority in
Israel is the Muslim community. Muslims comprise nearly 80% of the non-Jewish
population, and this community is left almost entirely alone to handle issues relating
to personal status. There are Muslim courts of first instance in which Muslim judges
(qadis)apply Muslim law (shari'a)to personal law cases. There is also a shari'acourt
of appeals in Jerusalem. (There is no ulema or set of formal religious scholars who
are affiliated with religious institutions in Israel. Nor is there a community of muftis
or religious specialists in Islamic law. i Thus, qadis are the main authorities who
interpret and apply the shari'ain Israel.) These Muslim courts are left to deal with
various personal law issues including: dower for brides-to-be; maintenance for divorced women; unilateral divorces by men (talaq); and succession. The qadis,
moreover, have a significant impact on these four areas. With respect to the first two
issues, evidence indicates that the qadis have encouraged the curtailing of dower and
promoted equitable maintenance payments to divorced women. With respect to the
last two issues, evidence suggests that the qadis have been unwilling to abolish
completely the practice of talaq and that women have yet to be given the same rights
to inherit as men. For further information on Muslim courts, see: Edelman, Courts,
Politics,and Culture, supra n. 9, at 77-88; Aharon Layish, Women and Islamic Law
in a Non-Muslim State: A Study Based on Decisions of Shari'a Courts in Israel(New
York, John Wiley & Sons, 1975); Nathan Brown, "Sharia and State in the Modern
Muslim Middle East" (1997) 29 Int'l J. Middle East Studies 359-76; Yitzhak Reiter,
Islamic Institutions in Jerusalem: PalestinianMuslim Organization under Jordanian and Israeli Rule (Boston, Kluwer Law International and Jerusalem Institute
for Israel Studies, 1997); Abdur Rahman I. Doi, Shari'ah and the Islamic Law
(London, Ta Ha Pub., 1984); John L. Esposito, Women in Muslim Family Law
(Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1982); Amira El Azhary Sonbol, Women, the
Family,and Divorce in Islamic History (Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1996).

No. 1, 2000]

PERSONAL LAW, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INDIA AND ISRAEL

lub

different persons according to their religious or ethnic identity. 13 Personal law systems are designed to preserve to each segment its own
law.' 4 In the last several centuries, the most prominent instances have
been personal law regimes in the areas of family law (marriage, divorce,
adoption, maintenance), intergenerational transfer of property (succession, inheritance, wills), and religious establishments (offices, premises,
and endowments).' 5 Such personal law typically co-exists with general
territorial law in criminal, administrative and commercial matters. 6
On occasion, some commercial or criminal rules may be included in
personal law.' 7
As the new millennium dawns, many countries that maintain such
personal law systems are under increasing pressure to abandon these
structures and adopt a regime of general rules that apply to all citizens.
According to Bassam Tibi, globalization and the twentieth century's
technological revolution have projected the concepts of fundamental
human rights and freedom to even the most culturally traditional
societies.'" As a result, countries with personal law systems experience
a clash between two ideological perspectives. Opponents of religiouslybased separate systems embrace a concept of universal human rights
where "there is an urgent need for establishing globally shared legal

13
14

15

16
17
18

Edouardo Vitta, The Conflict of Laws in Matters of PersonalStatus in Palestine(Tel
Aviv, S. Bursi, 1947) 14.
M.B. Hooker, Legal Pluralism:An Introductionto Colonial and Neo-Colonial Laws
(Oxford, Claredon Press, 1975); John H. Mansfield, "The Personal Laws or a Uniform
Civil Code?", in Robert Baird, ed., Religion and Law in Independent India (New
Delhi, Manohar Publishers, 1993) 139; M.P. Jain, Outlines of Indian Legal History
(Bombay, Tripathi, 1981) 369-70; 393-94.
Edelman, Courts, Politics and Culture, supra n. 9, at 52-53; Mansfield, "Personal
Laws", supra n. 14, at 144; for more on the jurisdiction of personal law see: Galanter,
"The Displacement of Traditional Law in Modern India", in Law and Society, supra
n. 1; J.D.M. Derrett, Religion, Law and State in India (London, Faber & Faber, 1968);
Derrett, Essays in Classical, supra n. 10; Tahir Mahmood, Muslim PersonalLaw,
Role of the State in the Indian Subcontinent (Nagpur, All-India Reporter, 1983); Tahir
Mahmood, Personal Laws in Crisis (New Delhi, Manohar, 1986); Rajeev Dhavan,
"Religious Freedom in India" (1987) 35 Am. J. Comp. L. 209-54; Izhak Englard, "Law
and Religion in Israel" (1987) 35 Am. J. Comp. L. 125-208.
Mansfield, "Personal Laws", supra n. 14, at 148-57.
Ibid., at 173-74.
Bassam Tibi, "Islamic Law/Shari'a, Human Rights, Universal Morality and International Relations" (1994) 16 Human Rights Q. 277-99.
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frameworks on cross-cultural foundations". 19 Those who favor maintaining personal law are suspicious of such (primarily Western-based)
concepts as human rights and individualism and challenge their compatibility with valued cultural traditions.2"
We shall return to this conflict after we have examined the different
ways in which personal law is institutionalized in India and Israel.

India - Division Between Religious Communities
India and Israel represent very different systems of institutionalizing personal law. In India, the British raj established a general territorial law that operated in a common law style and was administered
in a nationwide system of government courts. 21 Over time the substantive law came to resemble its British counterpart, through infusion of
common law and codification. 22 At the same time, the British preserved
enclaves of personal law. The Bengal regulation of 1772 provided that
in suits regarding inheritance, marriage, caste, and other usages and
institutions, the courts should apply "the laws of the Koran with regard
to Mohammedans, and those of the Shaster with respect to the Hin23
dus".
Under the British, the personal laws of Hindus and Muslims were
administered in the regular courts by judges trained in, and familiar
with, the style of the common law. 24 Until about 1860, the courts had
attached to them "native law officers," pandits and kazis, to advise them
on questions of Hindu and Muslim law respectively. 25 To make the law
more uniform, certain and accessible to British judges - as well as to
check the discretion of the law officers - the courts relied increasingly
on translations of texts, on digests and manuals, and on their own
precedents. 26 In 1860, when the whole court system was rationalized
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

Ibid., at 285.
Ibid., at 277-99.
Mansfield, "Personal Laws", supra n. 14, at 146-47.
Mahmood, Personal Law in Crisis, supra n. 15, at 42-43; Galanter, "The Displacement of Traditional Law in Modern India", Law and Society, supra n. 1.
Bengal Regulation of 1772. By 1793, the language wa s'amended to 'Mohamadan
Laws' and 'Hindu Laws'. Regulation IV of 1793, sec. 15.
Mansfield, "Personal Laws", supra n. 14, at 163.
Ibid.
Derrett, Religion, Law and State in India, supra n. 15, at 274-320.
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and unified, the law officers were abolished and the judges took exclu27
sive charge of finding and applying the personal law. These religious
law systems were now reduced to texts severed from the living systems
of administration and interpretation in which they were earlier embodied. Refracted through the common law lenses of judges and lawyers,
and rigidified by the common law principle of precedent, there 2evolved
distinctive bodies of Anglo-Hindu and Anglo-Muslim caselaw. 8
These bodies of personal law were administered by the courts of
British India and (later) independent India. The Constitution of 1950
appears to envision the dissolution of the personal law system in favor
of a Uniform Civil Code.29 Article 44, a non-justiciable Directive Principle, directs the state to "endeavor to secure3 0for the citizens a uniform
civil code throughout the territory of India".
After the Constitution came into force in 1950, the continued administration of separate bodies of personal law to the various religious
communities was challenged as a violation of the right to equality
guaranteed by the Constitution. The Indian courts upheld the continued validity of disparate personal laws and the power of the State to
create new rules applicable to particular religious communities. The
judges in the leading case 31 - a Hindu and a Muslim, both distinguished
legal scholars as well as prominent secularists - were sanguine about
the continued existence of personal law, presumably in anticipation of
its early replacement. The unwillingness, though, of the Muslim minority to relinquish the shari'a (or the Anglo-Muslim amalgam adminis-

27

28

29
30

31

On the transformation of Indian personal law, see Galanter, "The Displacement of
Traditional Law in Modern India", in Law and Society; supra n. 1; Derrett, Religion,
Law and State in India, supra n. 15, at 274-320.
Ibid.; also see The Shari'a (Application) Act of India of 1937 which according to
Derrett "was reactionary and tended entirely to the consolidation and unification of
that [Muslim] community in terms of its personal law". Derrett, Religion, Law and
State in India, supra n. 15, at 323.
Mansfield, "Personal Laws", supra n. 14, at 148-50.
Art. 44, The Constitution of India. But see ibid. Mansfield makes the argument that
the 7th Schedule of the Constitution (Item 5 List III), and Article 44 might also lend
support for the continuation of personal laws in the country. In addition, Mansfield
argues that the language in Article 372, sections 1 and 3, along with Article 13 (19)
indicates that the framers intended for "laws in force" prior to 1947 (which included
personal laws) to remain valid so long as they did not conflict with the Fundamental
Rights section of the Constitution.
State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali, A.I.R. 1952 Born. 84.
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tered in its name) side-tracked plans for a uniform code. Instead, the
reformist forces within the Hindu community fashioned a major codification and modification of Hindu law, enacting in 1955-1956 a series of
statutes known collectively as the Hindu Code.3 2 These acts modified the
Anglo-Hindu law in important ways. They abandoned the varna distinctions, the indissolubility of marriage, the preference for the extended joint family, and for inheritance by males only and by those who
can confer spiritual benefit. 33 In their place the new law emphasized the
nuclear family, introduced divorce, and endorsed the equality of varnas
and sexes.3 4 Very few rules remained with a specifically religious foundation.
The Hindu Code was in large measure tutelary:35 It mirrored "the
values of [the] governing groups rather than those of ... the congeries
of communities that make up Hinduism". 36 While diluting if not effacing
the traditional dharmasastric basis of Hindu law, the Hindu Code
legislation rearranged the relationship between the state and religious
authorities. It marked the acceptance of the Indian Parliament as a
kind of central legislative body for Hindus in matters of family and
social life.3 1 It discarded the notion, prevalent during the British period,
that government had no mandate or competence to redesign Hindu
society.3 8 In contrast to earlier times when the absence of centralized
governmental or ecclesiastical institutions rendered impossible general
or sweeping reforms, the modem Indian state now could accomplish
across-the-board changes.
32
33

34
35

36
37
38

Galanter, "The Displacement of Traditional Law in India", in Law and Society, supra
n. 1.
Ibid. Varnas refer to the four great estates or divisions of Hindu socio-legal theory,
often mistranslated as caste. Anglo-Hindu law contained a number of rules that
differed by varna.
Ibid. See also Derrett, Religion, Law and State in India, supra n. 15, at 321-51.
On the concept of tutelary laws, see Carl E. Schneider, "Moral Discourse, Bioethics,
and the Law" (1996) 26 The Hastings Center Report 37-39; Luis Oropeza, Tutelary
Pluralism: A Critical Approach to Venezuelan Democracy (Cambridge, Center for
International Studies, Harvard, 1983); for a more general discussion, see Robert
Dahl, Polyarchy:Participationand Opposition (New Haven, Yale University Press,
1971) 3.
Mansfield, "Personal Laws", supra n. 14, at 168.
Galanter, "The Displacement of Traditional Law in India", in Law and Society, supra
n. 1.
For a useful, extended discussion, consult Donald E. Smith, India as a SecularState
(Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1963).
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While retaining the personal law system, independent India introduced a note of voluntarism. The Special Marriage Act of 1872 had
provided a code of general law by which couples could chose to marry
and divorce, but in order to utilize this option they had to affirm that
neither was a Christian, Jew, Hindu, or Muslim. 39 In effect they had
to renounce their religious and property relations with their families. In
1954, Parliament passed a new Special Marriage Act that eliminated
40
the onerous renunciatory costs of availing oneself of civil marriage.
India continues to retain a system in which certain family matters
of Hindus, Muslims, Parsees, and Christians are governed by their
respective religious laws. There is also a set of religiously differentiated
public laws regulating religious endowments. While personal law in
India covers issues of adoption, succession and religious institutions,4
marriage and divorce are the main focus of public attention. Twelve
pieces of national legislation deal with particular issues of marriage and
divorce for the various religious groups in the country. 42 The administration of these personal laws in India remains in the hands of state
judges.
We submit that India's personal law system is not associated with
much conflict within the several religious communities. Political conflict in India over personal law appears more prevalent between, rather
than within, religious communities. This is not to say, however, that
intra-religious dissension is entirely absent in India. Debate about
women's rights ,in their respective personal law systems is present
within the Hindu, Christian, and Muslim communities. Many Hindu
women who champion equal rights for women support drastic reforms
within (if not a complete abandonment of) Hindu personal law. 43 Many

39
40
41
42

43

Special Marriage Act of 1872. Also see, J.D.M. Derrett, Hindu Law Past and Present
(Calcutta, A. Mukharjee & Co., 1957) 73.
Special Marriage Act of 1954; also see ibid., at 74.
Derrett, Religion, Law and State in India, supra n. 15, at 328.
The laws include: The Converts' Marriage Dissolution Act, 1866; The Indian Divorce
Act, 1869; The Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872; The Kazis Act, 1880; The Anand
Marriage Act, 1909; The Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929; The Parsi Marriage and
Divorce Act, 1936; The Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939; The Special
Marriage Act, 1954; The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955; The Foreign Marriage Act, 1969;
and The Muslim Women's Protection Act, 1986.
Interviews by the second author with leaders of the Multiple Action Research Group,
All-India Democratic Women's Association, and All-India Women's Association.
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Indian Christian women, similarly, struggle and protest against the
obstacles Christian personal law poses for women who seek divorce.44
And there is a series of feminist critiques of Muslim law's treatment of
45
women in divorce and maintenance.
This intra-religious conflict, however, is overshadowed by the tensions between religious communities in India. There is heated debate
over whether or not India should adopt a uniform civil code and thereby
abolish the various personal laws. Proponents of a uniform civil code
(who typically are Hindus) point to Articles 14 and 1546 of the Indian
Constitution as well as to Article 44 as evidence that the "uniform civil
code ...[is] an ideal towards which the state should strive".47 The
Hindu-nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the principal party in
the coalitions that have ruled since 1998, favors a uniform civil code.
Enactment of a uniform civil code was a tenet in the BJP platform in
the 1996 and 1998 national election campaigns. 48 But since coming to
power in the spring of 1998, the BJP has not initiated any formal
legislative proposals to alter the existing personal law structure. 49
On the other hand, opponents of a uniform civil code (typically
members of the minority religious communities) argue that the framers
respected the fact that various religious communities deeply identified
with their own personal laws and never intended for the country to

44

45

46

47
48
49

Shyamla Pappu, et al., "Women and the Law", in B.K. Pal, ed., Problems and
Concerns of Indian Women (New Delhi, ABC Publishing, 1987) 132-33; Epp, The
Rights Revolution, supra n. 9, at 79.
Anika Rahman, "Religious Rights Versus Women's Rights in India: A Test Case for
International Human Rights Law" (1990) 28 Columbia J. Transnational L. 473; S.
Raj, ed., Quest for Gender Justice: A Critique of the Status of Women in India
(Madras, T.R. Publications, 1991); Asghar Ali Engineer, ed., Problems of Muslim
Women in India (London, Sangam, 1995).
These two articles propound the fundamental rights of equality. Article 14 states:
"The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection
of the laws within the territory of India". Article 15(1) states: "The State shall not
discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place
of birth or any of them".
Mansfield, "Personal Law v. Uniform Civil Code", at 140.
Saba Naqvi Bhaumik, "Surviving Friends", India Today (internet edition), January
19, 1998; Khilnani, Idea of India, supra n. 6, at 189-90.
"Temple, Art. 370 not on Campaign Agenda: PM", Times of India (internet edition),
24 August 1999. In this article there is a direct quote from BJP party leader, K.N.
Govindacharya, who admits that the BJP "has not come out with its own manifesto"
with regard to a uniform civil code.
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implement one set of rules and regulations for its diverse population. 0
Many also contend that if a uniform civil code were adopted, the new
laws would reflect the outlook of the majority Hindu population.5 1

Shah Bano
The fear that a uniform civil code would jeopardize the rights and
integrity of minority religious communities manifested itself dramatically in response to the Indian Supreme Court's best-known and arguably most important decision on personal law - the now famous Shah
Bano case.

52

The story begins in 1975 with a Muslim woman, Shah Bano, who
after forty-three years of marriage found herself divorced by her husband Mohammad Ahmed Khan. 53 In accordance with Islamic law, the
divorce was performed by the procedure of talaq - that is the husband
declaring (three times) that he ends the marriage. 54 Throughout the
duration of the marriage Shah Bano had been a housewife who was
financially dependent on her husband. 55 With the marriage now ended,
Shah Bano was left with no means to support herself. She sued her
former husband under Section 125 of the Indian Criminal Procedure
Code for failing to provide her with adequate maintenance after the
divorce. Section 125 states that maintenance, up to a maximum of five

50
51

52
53

54

55

Mahmood, Muslim Personal Law, supra n. 15, at 118-25.
Raikumari Agrawala, "Uniform Civil Code: A Formula Not a Solution", in Tahir
Mahmood, ed., Family Law and Social Change (Bombay, M.N. Tripathi, 1975);
Master-Moos, "The Personal Law of Parsees", in Namada Khodie, ed., Readings in
Uniform Civil Code (Bombay, Thacker, 1975); Mahmood, Personal Law in Crisis,
supra n. 15.
Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 945, 945-55.
A.I.R 1985 S.C. 946-47; also see, Madhu Kishwar, "Pro Women or Anti-Muslim? The
Shah Bano Controversy", in Madhu Kishwar, Religion at the Service of Nationalism
(Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1998) 208; Robert Hargrave, "The Challenge of
Ethnic Conflict" (1993) 4 Journal of Democracy 54-68.
A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 947. For a discussion on talaq see n. 12. Note, a husband upon
saying a phrase such as "I divorce you", or "You are divorced", three times may end
the marriage. See Flavia Agnus, Law and GenderInequality: The Politicsof Women's
Rights in India (Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1999) 111-12; Bruce Lawrence,
Shattering the Myth (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1998) 131; Kishwar,
Religion at the Service, supra n. 53, at 217.
A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 947.
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hundred rupees a month, must be provided for a former spouse who
56
would otherwise be destitute.
Shah Bano filed her case in a lower court in the state of Madhya
Pradesh, where a magistrate ruled that her ex-husband was required
to pay a continual monthly maintenance payment of twenty-five rupees
a month (at that time about four American dollars).57 Disheartened at
the paltry amount awarded to her, Shah Bano appealed to the Madhya
Pradesh High Court, which in 1980 ruled that the payment should be
58
increased to approximately one-hundred eighty rupees.
Following this judgment, Mohammad Khan (a lawyer by profession)
appealed to the Supreme Court of India, reiterating the argument he
made in the lower courts: that because he satisfied section 127 of the
Indian Criminal Procedure Code, section 125 did not apply to him.
Section 127 states that section 125 shall not apply where a divorced
woman:
has received, whether before or after the date of the said order, the
whole of the sum which, under any customary or personal law,
59
applicable to the parties, was payable on such divorce.
Mohammad Khan contended that under Muslim personal law he had
paid the "whole" sum to Shah Bano, and that as a result, he owed her
no further payment.60 Because he had paid Shah Bano a dower (mehr)
of three thousand rupees prior to their marriage as well as financially
supported her for the requisite three-month period after their divorce
(iddat), Mohammad Khan claimed that he was no longer obliged to
maintain his former wife.6 1 Furthermore, Mohammad Khan rejected
Shah Bano's additional argument - that the Koran required, at the very
least, she receive a mataa, or a lump-sum payment made by the divorcing husband signifying the end of the marriage.2
According to
Mohammad Khan, mataa payments had to be made only by those who
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57
58
59
60
61
62

Sec. 125, All India Criminal Procedure Code.
A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 947.
Ibid.
Sec. 127 (3) (b), All India Criminal Procedure Code. This purpose of this section was
to accommodate dower or mehr.
A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 950-52.
Ibid.
Ibid., at 951.
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were considered pious in the eyes of Allah (muttaqeena). This was a
personal description he claimed did not apply to him.63
The Supreme Court, in a bench comprised of Justices Chandrachud,
Desai, Venkataramiah, Chinnappa Reddy, and Misra affirmed the
Madhya Pradesh High Court ruling and held that Mohammad Khan
was still responsible to his former wife for maintenance payments.64
Justice Chandrachud, writing for the Court, rejected Mohammad Khan's
interpretation of Muslim personal law. Relying on its own research and
understanding of the shari'a, the Court opined that the principles of
Islam, in fact, require that a husband not "discard his wife whenever he
chooses to do so"65 without first ensuring that she is financially secure.
The Supreme Court's arrogating to itself the power to ascertain
authentic Islamic law understandably elicited great anger within the
Muslim community. 66 Among many Muslims, there was a perception
that the Shah Bano judgment marked the beginning of the end to
Muslim personal law in India.6 7 Rather than judicially balancing the
general law against the personal law and then selecting the former as
the basis for its decision, the Supreme Court's attempt to interpret the
Shari'a, according to some observers, seemed to be an alarming move
6
to subvert Muslim personal law. 8
Two earlier Supreme Court cases, involving facts similar to Shah
Bano, had not aroused the kind of hostile reaction among Muslims that
was seen in 1985. In Bai Tahira v. Ali HusainFissalli69and in Fazlunbi
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65
66

67

68
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Ibid.
Ibid., at 954-55. Although we attribute no causal importance to this fact, it is
interesting to note that all of the five justices sitting in this case were at least
nominally Hindus.
Ibid., at 947.
This was not the first instance of the Supreme Court attempting to define the
essentials ofa religious tradition. In SastriYagnapurushdasjiv. MuldasBhundardas
Vaishya (also known as the Satsangis case, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1119), an earlier
Supreme Court propounded its view of the essence of Hinduism to invalidate the
practices of a Hindu sect. Galanter, "Hinduism, Secularism, and the Judiciary", in
Law and Society, supra n. 1.
Agnus, Law and Gender, supra n. 54, at 100-06; Lawrence, Shattering the Myth,
supra n. 54, at 163; Asghar Ali Engineer, "Forces Behind the Agitation", in Asghar
Ali Engineer, ed., The Shah Bano Controversy (Hyderabad, Orient, 1987) 39-41.
For an argument that Muslim law may, in fact, be more beneficial to women than
the Indian Criminal Procedure Code, see Saleem Akhtar, Shah Bano Judgment in
Islamic Perspective (New Delhi, Kitab Bhavan, 1994) 243-61.
A. I. R. 1979 S.C. 362.
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v. K Khader Vali,70 the Court twice upheld the rights of divorced Muslim
women to receive maintenance for a period beyond iddat. Why was
there no uproar by the Muslim community about either of these decisions? Perhaps the reason lies in the fact that the author of these two
judgments, Justice Krishna Iyer, judiciously weighed the personal law
against section 127 of the Criminal Procedure Code to arrive at decisions
that appear to have been accepted and respected by the opposing parties. As Madhu Kishwar notes, Krishna Iyer resists making any normative judgment about the shari'a, and in fact, "not once in the Bai
71
Tahira judgement does he even mention the word 'Muslim'".
Following the Shah Bano decision the Muslim lobby forced Prime
Minister Rajiv Gandhi to push through the Muslim Women's Protection
Act of 1986 which overturned the Court's decision and reinstated Muslim law, at least as previously understood.7 2 Not surprisingly, "Rajiv's
Law" further aggravated the conflict between many Hindus and Muslims over whether or not the country should impose a uniform civil code
for all Indian citizens.7 3 Just recently the Bombay High Court ruled that
"Rajiv's Law" actually entitles a divorced Muslim woman to maintenance payments for her "entire future".7 4 Some observers predict that
this Bombay judgment will rekindle the types of tensions between
Hindus and Muslims similar to those aroused by the 1985 Shah Bano
decision. 5
There are other examples of inter-religious tensions over personal
law questions as well. For example, Indian Parsees argue that without
separate personal law systems the result would be a uniform civil code

70

A. I. R. 1980 S.C. 1730.

71
72

Kishwar, Religion at the Service, supra n. 53, at 206-07.
Epp, The Rights Revolution, supra n. 9 88; Danial Latifi, "The Muslim Women Bill",
in Asghar Ali Engineer, ed., The Shah Bano Controversy, supra n. 67.
Since 1986 there have been two unreported cases, described by Flavia Agnus, in
which an Allahabad High Court judge deemed talaq-divorces unconstitutional. See,
Agnus, Law and GenderEquality, supra n. 54, at 112-16. The unreported cases are:
Rahmat Ullah v. State of UP., Writ Petition no. 45 of 1993, and Khatoon Nisa v. State
of U.P., Writ Petition no. 57 of 1993.
Sultan Shahin, "Ulema to Launch Campaign for Personal Law", Times of India
(internet edition), 6 May 1999. At present, case cite unavailable to authors. The
authors have contacted sources in India to provide cite. (This case was decided by
a two-judge bench.)
Ibid.
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that would inevitably reflect mainly Hindu interests 7. 6 Many Christians
also fear that their status and autonomy as a minority community may
be in jeopardy without separate personal laws.7 7 Christians in the state
of Kerala are especially sensitive to this issue, as indicated by their
reaction to a 1986 decision by the Supreme Court. In Mary Roy v. State
of Kerala,the Court held that a 1916 statute known as the TravancoreCochin Christian Succession Act violated women's constitutional rights
to inherit property.78 Christian protestors rejected this ruling as part
of an effort to undermine a legitimate minority community. 79 Arguably,
the current wave of violence against Christians may deepen this community's worries that without established personal laws they may lose
80
their identity as well as their ability to practice their religion freely.

India - The "Second" Set of PersonalLaws: Affirmative Action
Eligibility
In addition to its "traditional" personal law, India has a new body of
rules which are a cousin to the personal laws and are also applied on
the basis of personal identity; we call this India's "second" system of
personal law. Since independence, India has pursued a wide array of
policies of preferential treatment intended to benefit disadvantaged
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For a discussion of this position, see Agnus, Law and Gender, supra n. 54, at 12940; J. Hinnells, "Parsi Attitudes to Religious Pluralism", in Howard G. Coward, ed.,
Modern IndianResponses to Religious Pluralism(Albany, New York, 1987); also see
more generally M. Shabbir and S. Manchanda, ParsiLaw in India (Allahabad, Law
Books Company, 1991).
For a discussion of this position, see Agnus, Law and Gender, supra n. 54, at 14163; Srimati Basu, She Comes to Take Her Rights (Albany, SUNY Press, 1999)202.
A.I.R. 1986 SC 1011.
V. Menon, "Mother Roy", Rediff on the Net, 1997 (http://www.rediff.com/news/oct/
30arun.htm). This news web-site discusses how after the Court decision, there was
a backlash by the Christian community; also see Basu, at 201-02, 191-92.
The last half of 1998 and the first half of 1999 saw widespread reports of attacks on
Christians in India. For a sample of articles, see: Dakshina Murthy, "Christian
Prayer Service Attacked", Hindustan Times (internet edition), 24 November 1998;
"23 Million Christians to Protest Today", Hindustan Times (internet edition), 4
December 1998; "CBI Accuses 18 in Stains Murder Case", Times of India (internet
edition), 23 June 1999; "Panel Presents Admission-Related Facts", Times of India
(internet edition), 17 July 1999.
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caste and tribal groups.8 1 These policies of "compensatory discrimination" include legislative set-asides, reserved places in government services, reserved educational admissions, scholarships, and other special
benefits.8 2 These benefits are for groups traditionally considered as
"untouchables" who are classified as Scheduled Castes, and for tribal
groups categorized as Scheduled Tribes. They comprise, respectively,
some 15% and 7% of the population.8 3 An even larger set of groups
designated as Other Backward Classes (OBC's) are included within
some of the reservation and benefit schemes; the vast bulk of these
potential beneficiaries are Hindus. 4
In the area of this "second" personal law, there is conflict on collective
and individual levels. At the collective level, there is controversy over
which groups are entitled to enjoy such benefits. Although the main
contours of compensatory discrimination policies are determined by
legislators, their decisions about which groups will be included as
beneficiaries have frequently been reviewed by the courts, who have
developed a jurisprudence of group standing and boundaries that draws
on the jurisprudence of the personal law. 5
Since its founding, the Supreme Court has been active in defining
86
which groups qualify as OBC's. In Venkataramanav. State of Madras,
the Courtlruled that underprivileged caste groups could be considered
within the OBC category. In Balaji v. State of Mysore,87 the Court, while
condemning the use of caste as a means of classification for state
reservations, nevertheless upheld the legislature's method of categorization on the basis of caste identity. Other cases from this period also
demonstrate the Court's willingness to shape the parameters of the
OBC category. In Chitralekhav. State ofMysore,88 the Court reaffirmed
the central tenet of Balaji, but qualified that decision by stating that
factors apart from caste also must be considered.
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Marc Galanter, Competing Equalities (Berkeley, University of California Press,
1984) 41-42.
Ibid., at 43-44.
Ibid., at 43.
Ibid., at 42. OBC's may include non-Hindu, tribal, and nomadic groups as well.
Ibid., at 534-35.
A. I. R. 1951 S.C. 229.
A. I. R. 1963 S.C. 649.
A. I. R. 1964 S.C. 1823.
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The Supreme Court, more recently, has continued to maintain a
similar approach. In a landmark 1992 decision (IndraSawhny v. Union
of India), the Court upheld the central government's response to the
Mandal Commission Report. The Mandal Commission was established
by the Janata Party-led government following the defeat of Indira
Gandhi's Congress Party in 1977. The purpose of the Commission, led
by a retired civil servant named B.P. Mandal, was to ascertain which
groups should be deemed Other Backward Classes and how to improve
their socio-economic conditions.8 9 In 1980, the Commission issued its
report in which it proposed affirmative action programs for a majority
of India's population on the basis of their membership in lower castes.
It called for reservation of 27% of central government jobs as well as
seats in higher educational institutions for members of these groups. 90
After a decade of lying dormant, the Commission's report was revived
by Prime Minister V.P. Singh in 1990. In attempting to implement the
report, Singh faced strong opposition both at the government and grassroots levels. 91 In response to a constitutional challenge to the government's implementation of the Mandal Commission report, the Supreme
Court in 1992 ruled, in a nearly three-hundred-page opinion, that the
state indeed had the prerogative to set aside government posts and
educational seats on the basis of group's caste-status, so long as other
factors were considered as well. 92 The Court ruled that Article 16 (4)
provides the state with constitutional authority to continue pursuing
compensatory discrimination schemes.9 3
Affirmative action benefits, thus, can be conferred on the basis of
membership in designated groups. Courts then confront cases in which
they must decide which individuals are members of the designated
groups and therefore eligible for preferences. In these cases, judges face
determinations of individual identity that closely resemble the ques-
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Sunita Parikh, The Politics of Preference(Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press,
1997) 186.
Ibid, at 187.
Ibid, at 187-89. Parikh describes how Singh's policy decision sparked a chain of
events that eventually led to the downfall of his government.
Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, A. I. R. 1993 S.C. 477
Ibid, at 536-54. Note, the Court also stressed the importance of Article 16(1) of the
Constitution, which guarantees "equality of opportunity in matters of public employment". The Court noted that in order eventually to arrive at a situation where there
could be equal opportunity for all, the government's plan needed to be implemented.
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tions of identity implicated in the administration of the personal law.
For example, there has been an ongoing question over whether or not
"untouchable" Hindus (dalits)who convert to Christianity should continue to qualify for compensatory discrimination benefits. 94 The courts
have ruled fairly consistently that converts cannot claim such benefits. 5
"The general rule, is conversion [by an individual] operates as an
expulsion from the caste. ... [A] convert ceases to have any caste"96 and
thereby any grounds to claim compensatory discrimination benefits.
The difficulty these "Christian dalits" have in obtaining benefits is
particularly troubling for leaders in the Indian Christian community.
As Dr. Godfrey Shiri, associate director of the Christian Institute for the
Study of Religion and Society (CISRS), notes, "just because these dalits
are now Christians does not mean their socio-economic status has
improved".97
Elaborating on the conversion theme, however, the Supreme Court
has ruled that converts to Christianity who reconvert back to Hinduism
may qualify for compensatory discrimination benefits upon acceptance
by that group.98 Where an individual who otherwise would not qualify
for compensatory discrimination benefits marries into a lower caste that
is eligible for such preferences, the courts have ruled that sometimes
(but not always) membership in the lower caste group may be acquired
by acceptance by the group. 99 However, where an otherwise ineligible
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Swami Agnivesh, "A Concept of Insecurity", Hindustan Times (internet edition), 23
January 1999. In this article, Agnivesh is critical of converts to Christianity who
"shout for government charity"; also consider, John Webster, The Dalit Christians:
A History (Delhi, ISPCK, 1994).
Galanter, Competing Equalities, supra n. 81, at 312-14.
Ibid., at 312, quoting from Michael v. Venkataswaran,A. I. R. 1952 Mad. 478.
Jayanth Krishnan's interview with Dr. Godfrey Shiri, November 14, 1998, Bangalore,
India.
Rajagopal v. Armugam, A. I. R. 1969 S.C. 101. Obvious questions emerge, including:
What constitutes acceptance? Is acceptance required of the whole caste or just a
section of it? See Galanter, Competing Equalities, supra n. 81, at 328-29.
Wilson Reade v. C.S. Booth, A. I. R. 1958 Ass. 128, Horo v. JahanAra, A. I. R. 1972
S.C. 1840. But see, Urmila Ginda v. Union of India, A. I. R. 1975 Del. 115, where
the Delhi High Court ruled that a high caste woman who sought membership into
her husband's lower caste group for the purposes of seeking a government-reserved
post, could not be admitted into this lower caste, even by the acceptance of its
members. See also, Mrs. Vaishali v. Union of India, 1978 80 Bom LR 182; Smt. D.
Neelima v. The Dean of P.G. Studies, A. I. R. 1993 Andh Pra 299.
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individual is adopted into a family that qualifies for benefits, the courts
have considered other factors, including the adoptee's lifestyle prior to
being adopted, instead of whether or not there is community accept00
ance.
In 1996, the Supreme Court ruled that when an individual who
enjoyed an "advantageous start in life" as a member of a "forward
group"converts, marries, or is adopted into a group eligible for reservations, that individual does not become eligible for the benefits to which
members of the group are entitled."'
when a member is transplanted into the Dalits, Tribes and OBC's,
...
he/she must of necessity also undergo the same handicaps, be subject
to the same disabilities, disadvantages, indignities or sufferings so
as to entitle the candidate to avail the facility of reservation. A
candidate who had the advantageous start in life being born in
forward caste and had march of advantageous life but is transplanted
in backward caste by adoption, marriage or conversion does not
,0'
become eligible to the benefit of reservation ...
Judicial decisions about personal identity in the area of compensatory discrimination are influenced by, although do not necessarily conform to, the doctrines that prevail in the traditional personal law.
Clearly, the "second personal law" in India remains highly salient and
is slated to grow as affirmative action policies become more nuanced and
0 3
more contested.'

100 See, Shantha Kumar v. State of Mysore, 1971 Mys. L. J. 21; also see, Galanter,
Competing Equalities,supra n. 81, at 339-41; also see, Natraja v. Selection Committee, 1971 1 Mys IJ226; R. Srinivasa v. Chairman,Selection Committee, A. I. R. 1981
Karnataka 86; A.S. Sailajav. Kurnool Medical College Kurnoon, A. I. R. 1986 Andh
Pra 209; N. B. Rao v. Principal, Osmania Medical College, A. I. R. 1986 Andh Pra
196. But also see, Khazan Singh v. Union of India, A. I. R. 1980 Delhi 60, where the
court ruled that an adoption alone into a Scheduled Caste family was enough to
acquire benefits.
101 Valsamma Paul v. Cochin University, A. I. R. 1996 1011.
102 Ibid., at 1022.
103 Khilnani, Idea of India, supra n. 6, at 37.
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PersonalLaw in Israel- Division Within Religious Communities
In spite of this "second" personal law, most of the conflict over
traditional personal laws in India is between religious communities. By
contrast, conflict over the application of personal law in Israel occurs
mainly within the majority religious community. Israel is a curious
democracy. On the one hand, it was founded in order to be the national
homeland of the Jewish people. 10 4 Judaism is not a state religion, but
the state recognizes a special relation to it. As Martin Edelman observes, "religion in Israel is virtually synonymous with [Judaism, in
particular] Orthodox Judaism".1 0 5 On the other hand, Israel prides itself
on treating all religious communities in a fair and equitable manner.
While some 80% of the population is Jewish, 0 6 the state attempts
actively to protect the religious freedom of the nearly one million non0 7
Jewish Israeli citizens.
in contrast with India, Israel exemplifies an entirely different system
of administering personal law. The Israeli personal law structure
descends from the millet system of the Ottoman Empire. 0 8 Under the
millet system, each of the communities in the Empire - such as the
Greek, Armenian, Jewish, Muslim, and Druze communities - had its
own set of courts. 10 9 These courts were staffed by expositors of religious
law who were empowered to apply their law to the respective communities. In instances of inter-communal conflict, matters were relegated
to government courts. Since Islam was "the official religion of the
Ottoman Empire", 0 it was not uncommon for these courts to apply the
104 Asher Arian, Politics in Israel: The Second Generation (Chatham, Chatham House,
1989) 18.
105 Edelman, Courts, Politics,and Culture, supra n. 9, at 51.
106 Krislov, "Israel", supra n. 8, at 302.
107 According to statistics, the population of Israel is approximately six million people.
Non-Jewish populations include Muslims (nearly fifteen percent of the total population), Christians (approximately two percent) and Druze (about 1.6 percent). Figures
are from Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics.
108 Englard, Religious Law, supra n. 10, at 13.
109 Vitta, PersonalStatus, supra n. 13, at chap. 6, 145-75. Also, according to Lewis, the
formal millet system was extended to the Jewish community in the 19th century.
Bernard Lewis, The Jews of Islam (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1984).
110 Edelman, Courts, Politics, and Culture in Israel, supra n. 9, at 76; for a further
discussion of how Islam was the official religion of the state also see Lord Kinross,
The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fallof the Turkish Empire (New York, Quill,
1977) 112.
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shari'a. The millet system conferred on the rabbinical courts full
authority over all disputes among Jews,' including marriage and
guardianship,
divorce, as well as maintenance, inheritance (succession),
112
burial.
and
adoption,
legitimation, incompetency,
With the arrival of the British Mandate, the rabbinical courts saw
their jurisdictional authority shrink. The British administration of
mandatory Palestine (1918-1948) established government courts (again
in the common law style), but retained the millet system in matters of
marriage, divorce, alimony, and succession.1 1 3 Each of the religious
communities had a court staffed by religious authorities who applied
their respective religious laws.
When Israel achieved independence in 1948, there was a further
transformation of the millet system. In a deal, known as the "status
quo" agreement, struck between the secular Zionist government of
David Ben-Gurion and the religious parties of the time, it was agreed
that the government would maintain the existing patterns of publicly4
enforced religious observance and recognition of religious authority."
The Israeli government, specifically, opted to maintain the general
system of allowing religious groups to retain their respective religious
111 Ibid., at 52.
112 Informally, the scope of rabbinic and communal control extended further to regulation of property employment, and consumption. As Shaw states, "Together Jewish
law and custom, community regulations and customs and judicial decisions constituted what amounted to a code of law and jurisprudence which regulated in great
detail all religious, social and economic areas of life in each Jewish community as well
in the millet as a whole. The kahal enforced them with a kind of policy surveillance
to make certain that they were applied, whether in the temple, the school, the
marketplace, or the home. Various penalties such as herem (excommunication) and
niddui (bans) were imposed by the bet din courts and by rabbis against those who
violated the laws and regulations or their provisions and instructions. Prisons were
maintained in the synagogue buildings, usually on the ground floors directly beneath
the sanctuaries, to punish members who violated the community regulations and
laws, while violators of the Sultan's laws and those requiring execution and more
severe or lengthy punishments were turned over to Ottoman police and prisons".
Stanford J. Shaw, The Jews of the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic (New
York, New York University Press, 1991) 65.
113 Edelman, Courts, Politics,and Culture, supra n. 9, at 52.
114 Among other things, the status quo agreement provides for: the Sabbath as the
official holiday for state institutions; kashrut in all state institutions; rabbinical
control over family law; and a two-track educational system where Jews may opt to
send their children to orthodox religious schools that are only minimally monitored
by the state. Ibid., at 5; Asher Arian, Politics in Israel, supra n. 104, at 238.
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laws to govern certain matters relating to the family. Later, the status
quo agreement was narrowed by the Knesset in 1953; rabbinical courts
115
retained a monopoly only to regulate marriages and divorces.
The present situation in Israel is that some questions within the
"traditional" ambit of personal law are determined by religious judicial
institutions while others are determined by state judicial institutions.
This legal division does not ameliorate the social division within the
Jewish population, for many Orthodox Jews believe that all personal
law matters should be handled by rabbinical courts, while secularists
and non-Orthodox Jews resent being subject to Orthodox rabbinic control, particularly in matters of vital concern such as marriage and
116
divorce.
All Jews - regardless of whether or not they are Orthodox - fall
under the jurisdiction of the rabbinical courts in matters of marriage
and divorce. 1 17 In matters of marriage and divorce, there is no civil law
for Israeli Jews."" Jews wishing to marry in Israel must seek the
approval of the rabbinical courts that apply Jewish religious law, or
Halachah.119 Some observers note that after 1947 the rabbinical authorities have interpreted the Halachah more strictly than before the
20
creation of the State.'
What specifically is it about adhering to the Halachah and the
authority of rabbinical courts that many non-Orthodox Jews find so
objectionable? For one thing, in order for Jews to be married in Israel,

115 See Edelman, Courts, Politics, and Culture, supra n. 9, at 52-53, for a useful
discussion of this evolution of Jewish law from the time of the Ottomans through the
time of the British Mandate and until 1955.
116 Yet, see ibid., 54-57, where Edelman argues that the debate over the jurisdictional
authority of the rabbinical courts is just one source of tension between the Orthodox
and non-Orthodox communities. Another source, he contends, may be in the overall
interpretation of what political culture and national identity mean in Israel to these
communities. For the traditional Orthodoxy, religion is inseparable from Israeli
political culture and Israeli national identity, while for the less or non-religious
segment of the population, religion is separable from these other two concepts.
117 Baker, Legal System of Israel, supra n. 9, at 159-82.
118 Yael Yishai, Between the Flag and the Banner: Women in Israeli Politics (SUNY,
Albany, 1997) 186.
119 Frances Raday, "Religion, Multiculturalism and Equality: The Israeli Case" (1996)
25 Isr. Yrbk Hum. Rts. 211, 214-15.
120 Edelman, supra n. 9, at 53; also see M. Elon, "The Sources and Nature of Jewish Law
and its Application in the State of Israel" (1968) 3 Is. L.R. 416-53.
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the rabbinical courts must find that both the man and the woman are,
in fact, Jews. The rabbinical courts, thus, prohibit marriage between
a Jew and a non-Jew.' 21 In order to be deemed a Jew, the individual
must prove that he/she is a child of a Jewish mother, or that he/she was
converted in a ceremony recognized by the rabbinical court.122 Oftentimes,
however, proving that an individual's mother was Jewish or securing
agreement that a conversion conformed to the Halachahis not so simple
a task.

123

The rabbinical courts also bar mamzerim (Jews born of adulterous
unions) from marrying Jews other than other mamzerim.124 Jewish
couples whose marriage ends without the approval of the rabbinical
court are forbidden to remarry. Jewish women who commit adultery are
not permitted to divorce and remarry the individual with whom they are
having the relationship. Jewish law forbids kohanim from marrying
divorcees. 2 '
The imposition of such marital restrictions by the rabbinical courts
pushes many Israeli Jews to marry outside of the country. (Valid
marriages performed outside Israel are recognized as legitimate by the
126
Israeli government according to principles of private international law).
Obviously traveling abroad for marriage entails considerable trouble

121 Englard, Religious Law, supra n. 10, at 62, 176.
122 Ibid., at 62.
123 Recently immigrated Ethiopians and Russians who have come to Israel under the
"law of return" continually find that the rabbinical courts often refuse to recognize
their Jewish identity for the purposes of marriage. Interviews with members from
the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (October 1998); also for a sample of articles
on this subject, see Aryeh Dean Cohen, "Russian Immigrants Believe PM Caves in
to Haredim", The Jerusalem Post (internet edition), 12 May 1999; Haim Shapiro,
"Ministry Must Justify not Registering Ethiopian Family as Jews", The Jerusalem
Post (internet edition), 22 June 1999.
124 D. Sharfman, Living Without a Constitution (New York, M.E. Sharpe, 1993) 79.
125 Ibid, at 79-80. Kohanim are the "priestly caste"; membership passes patrilineally.
126 Funk and Schlesinger v. Minister of Internal Affairs (1963) 17 P.D. 222). As of
February 2000, another channel opened for a limited group of Israelis. The Interior
Ministry on 13 February 2000, announced that it will "now recognize consular
marriages for couples at least one of whom is a citizen of a state that authorizes its
consuls to perform such marriages". Etta Prince-Gibson, "Consular Marriages: An
Unorthodox Solution", The Jerusalem Post, 18 February 2000. Critics suggest that
the new policy does not go far enough in providing the basic right of marriage to all
Israelis. The article notes that nearly a quarter-million citizens still cannot marry
even with this new policy.
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and expense. Much of the non-Orthodox community holds the rabbini127
cal courts in contempt for causing them to incur such problems.
The hostility the non-Orthodox feel is not confined to the rabbinical
courts wielding such power over Jewish marriages; the non-Orthodox
are quite angry because these courts also control the process of divorce. 12 8 While divorce is allowable by Jewish law, rabbinical courts
strongly favor preserving marriages. As observers note, contemporary
rabbinical courts allow women to obtain divorces on many more grounds
than in previous times. 129 But in form, the divorce is achieved only when
the husband renounces the wife by delivering to her (under the supervision of a bet din, or rabbinical court) a get. 30 Rabbinical courts insist
that the husband actually deliver a get to his wife in order to finalize
a divorce. 3 ' Where a wife receives approval from the rabbinical courts
to divorce her husband, but the husband refuses to grant a get, the
rabbinical courts will not decree a divorce. Under Israeli state law, the
wife may ask the Attorney General to demand that the husband appear
before the (state) district court to explain why he refuses to grant the
get. 3 2 If the district court is dissatisfied with the husband's response,
it can order the husband jailed until he delivers the divorce decree to
the wife.13 3 Sometimes the district court declines to jail the husband;
and even if the husband is jailed, a get may still not be issued to the
wife. 3 4 What results, then, is that the wife is left to live her life as an
agunah (literally a "tied" woman). She cannot re-marry under Jewish
law, 35 and if she were to do so under some other legal provision (say by

127 For an excellent review of the political and legal setting in Israel, see Yoav Dotan,
"Judicial Review and Political Accountability" (1998) 32 Is. L.R. 448-74.
128 Raday, "Religion, Multiculturalism and Equality, supra n. 119, at 211.
129 Today, divorce most frequently occurs as a result of both parties mutually agreeing
to end the marriage. (Jayanth Krishnan's interviews with lawyers from four of the
country's most active women's organizations: Women's International Zionist Organization, Israeli Women's Network, Emunah, and Na'mat, October, 1998).
130 Baker, Legal System of Israel, supra n. 9, at 210.
131 Ibid.
132 Edelman, Courts, Politics, and Culture, supra n. 9, at 64.
133 Baker, Legal System of Israel, supra n. 9, at 210.
134 Sharfman, Living Without a Constitution, supra n. 124, at 79. Also see internet
edition of the Jerusalem Post, 1 March 1999, where the article entitled, "Chained
Women to Picket Rabbinate Today", reports stories very similar to this scenario still
occurring throughout the country.
135 Yishai, Between the Flag, supra n. 118, at 186-87.
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obtaining a foreign civil divorce recognized in Israel), her children would
be deemed mamzerim by the rabbinical courts.
The fact that Orthodox rabbinical courts possess the authority to
decide "who is a Jew" for the purposes of marriage as well as "who may
divorce," provides this religious institution with the capacity of shaping
the social identities of many Israelis. Individuals who have always
thought of themselves as Jewish may learn that, in the eyes of the
dayyanim,'136 they are actually not Jews. Women, likewise, who wish to
end a marriage but are unable to do so are disabled from remarrying or
starting new families. 137 In light of these problems, it is not surprising
that sentiment exists in the non-Orthodox community to revamp marriage and divorce laws within Israel.
The rabbinical courts are not the only legal institution that affects
Jewish identity in Israel. State courts, too, play an important and,
according to many in the Orthodox community, damaging role in many
aspects of Jewish life. As previously stated, prior to the creation of the
state, the personal law jurisdiction included a number of matters in
addition to marriage and divorce. For centuries these matters, and
matters more generally relating to Jewish identity, were within the
domain of the rabbis. But as Martin Edelman notes, since 1953 the state
has reduced the jurisdiction of the rabbinical courts and allowed nonreligious, state courts to decide on many of these "personal laws" as well
as on laws that more broadly affect "who is a Jew". 138 Those within the
religious community see both types of involvement by state courts as a
violation of the "status quo" agreement, and as contributing towards the
further division of the Jewish people.

136 Dayyanim is the Hebrew word for rabbinical court judges. These particular judges
are state officials. In order to serve they must take a competitive examination
administered by the Chief Rabbinical Council. Members of a nomination committee
within the Council then select the dayyanim. Edelman, Courts, Politics,and Culture,
supra n. 9, at 53.
137 As opposed to restrictions on agunot, "the male divorce refusenik, on the other hand,
can start a new family without fearing that the children born to the union will be
bastards [mamzerim] (meaning that they can only marry other bastards [mamzerim])".
Sharfman, Living Without a Constitution, supra n. 124, at 79. In addition, the
problem of the agunah, (the married woman who separates from her husband but
cannot remarry) is a classic and perturbing problem of Jewish law. Women whose
husbands refuse a divorce are not the only agunot: the other major instance is the
abandoned woman who is unable to prove that her husband is dead.
138 Edelman, Courts, Politics, and Culture, supra n. 9, at 52-53, 62-63.
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The encroachment by state courts upon the "turf'of rabbinical courts
dates back to the 1960's. In the famous Brother Daniel case, 139 the
Israeli Supreme Court decided in 1962 that it, not the rabbinate, would
dictate who could qualify as a Jew for purposes of applying for the
country's "Law of Return".141 "Who is a Jew," thus, was decided by a
state, not religious, institution.
Yoav Dotan highlights how this tension continues to exist as a result
of subsequent decisions by the Supreme Court.' 4 1 For example, in Keren
v. Minister for Affairs of Religion, the Court ruled that non-orthodox
religious groups must be given equal access to state funding. 142 In
Adguaitzo v. GeneralRabbinicalCouncil of Israel,the Court sided with
Jewish immigrant groups who were adversely affected by a ruling from
a rabbinical court in a conversion case. 143 In Miller v. Minister of
Interior,the Court held that conversions by Reform and Conservative
rabbis would be granted official recognition. 4 1 Most relevant to our
study, in Bavli v. Grand RabbinicalCourt the Court ruled that rabbinical courts are obliged to adhere to the principle of equal property rights
in cases of divorce.14 After being sued for divorce by her husband, Hava
Bavli (the wife) argued in the lower rabbinical court that she was
entitled to half of the couple's assets. Shmuel Bavli (the husband)
contended that a strict interpretation of the Halachadid not recognize
the division of marital property. The lower rabbinical court sided with
the husband and dismissed Hava Bavli's claim stating she had no case
under Jewish law. The Rabbinical Court of Appeals upheld the lower
court ruling. The Supreme Court of Israel, however, disagreed and
refused to allow Jewish law to govern in this case. The Court held that
while Jewish law would continue to govern marriage and divorce, all
related matters (including division of marital property) would fall under
the jurisdiction of state law.
139 Rufeisen v. Minister of the Interior (Brother Daniel Case) (1962) 16 P.D. 2428.
140 The Law of Return is a statute that was passed by the 1950 Knesset. The law permits
every Jew in the world to immigrate to Israel. As Asher Arian eloquently states, "the
Law of Return is the concrete expression of the prophetic vision of the 'ingathering
of the exiles.'" (Arian, Second Republic, p. 10).
141 Dotan, "Judicial Review and Political Accountability", supra n. 127.
142 Keren v. Minister for Affairs of Religion (1989) 43(ii) P.D. 661.
143 Adguaitzo v. General Rabbinical Council of Israel (1989) 43(ii) P.D. 152.
144 Miller v Minister of Interior(1986) 40(iii) P.D. 436.
145 Bauli v. Grand Rabbinical Court (1994) 48(ii) P.D. 221; ruling later reaffirmed in
Aknin v. District RabbinicalCourt of Haifa et al. (1996) 50(i) P.D. 370.
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In theory, "[iun both its appellate and general equity capacities, the
Supreme Court of Israel can consider matters relating to the various
religious court systems only with regard to the jurisdiction of those
courts to resolve a particular matter". 146 Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court continues to venture into legal terrain that many within the
Orthodox community believe is beyond the Court's domain. In early
1999, the Court was sharply attacked by ultra-Orthodox Jews who were
upset not only with the Court's intervention in matters relating to
marriage and divorce, but also with its involvement in various "second
personal law" questions of Jewish identity. 147 The ultra-Orthodox were
particularly angered by recent decisions that, in their view, undermined
Judaism.148 Since the Court is rarely subject to public challenge, the
recent attacks on the Court by the ultra-Orthodox have been of grave
concern to many in the government.
The tension between the Orthodox and non-Orthodox communities
in Israel is a complicated issue. One thing, though, is certain: Each side
believes that the other is contributing to the "decay"' 49 of Jewish society.
The internal conflict is mirrored in the dual legal system within the
country in which certain questions of personal law and Jewish identity
are decided by religious courts while others are decided by state courts.
Abolishing this dual system would further anger and alienate the
Orthodox side. Many Muslims and Christians would also oppose such
a change. Even if it were politically feasible, which it is not at the
moment, further abridgment of the power of the rabbinical courts is
fraught with danger to the already strained fabric of civil life in Israel.

146 Edelman, Courts, Politics, and Culture, supra n. 53, at 32.
147 We define "second personal laws" as issues including matters relating to education,
conversion, burial, and exemption from military service that turn on the relation of
public law to Jewish law and those who claim to interpret it.
148 The Jerusalem Post (internet edition) "A List of Haredi Grievances", 12 February
1999. Also see, response by ultra-orthodox to Hoffman et al. v. The Guardianof the
Western Wall, (1994) 48() P.D. 263, in The Jerusalem Post, "Women of the Wall Win
High Court Hearing" 18 February 1999. And see, Arie Caspi, "Two States for Two
Nations", Haaretz 19 February 1999.
149 This term "decay" has been used by many scholars who study political culture. It
refers to the destabilization or slow destruction of a political, social, or cultural
community as a result of institutional in-fighting and instability. See, James Manor,
"India", in Shively's ComparativeGovernance, supra n. 8, at 80. Also see Samuel P.
Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Yale University
Press, 1980).
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ConcludingThoughts
We have described how two personal law systems operate within two
different religiously plural societies. We note six major differences that
exist between the Indian and Israeli situations. First, there is a difference in the location of the personal law courts. In Israel, personal laws
are administered by qualified religious specialists in courts that are part
of, or attached to, religious institutions. By contrast, in India personal
law is applied by common-law-trained judges in the regular state courts.
Second, both the Indian Supreme Court and the Israeli Supreme
Court (especially in its capacity as the High Court of Justice) have
intervened actively in human rights and public interest cases. 150 While
the Supreme Court of India has been quite active in advancing the
rights of many sorts of public interest claimants,5' Indian judicial
activism, has not, with rare exceptions, addressed questions of personal

150 Dotan demonstrates that the Israeli state judiciary has been an active policy-maker
in a range of rights-based matters. See, Dotan, "Judicial Review and Political
Accountability", supra n. 127, and see, Yoav Dotan, "Judicial Rhetoric, Government
Lawyers, and Human Rights: The Case of the Israeli High Court of Justice During
the Intifada" (1999) 33 Law and Society R. 319-63.
151 Carl Baar, "Social Action Litigation in India: The Operations and Limitations of the
World's Most Active Judiciary" (1990) 19 Policy Studies J. 140-50; Upendra Baxi,
Courage, Craft, and Contention: The Supreme Court in the 1980's (Bombay, M.N.
Tripathi, 1985); P.N. Bhagwati, "Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation"
(1985) 23 Columbia J. Transnational L. 561-77; Jamie Cassels, 'Judicial Activism
and Public Interest Litigation in India: Attempting the Impossible?" (1989) 37 Am.
J. Comp. L. 495; Clark Cunningham, "Public Interest Litigation in Indian Supreme
Court: A Study in the Light of American Experience" (1987) 29 J. Indian Law Instit.
494-523; Rajeev Dhavan, 'Law as Struggle: Public Interest Law in India", (1994) 36
J. Indian Law Instit. 302-38; Madhava Menon, "Justice Sans Lawyers: Some Indian
Experiments" (1985) 12 Indian Bar Rev. 444; G.L. Peiris, "Public Interest Litigation
in the Indian Subcontinent: Current Dimensions" (1991) 40 Intl and Comp. L.Q. 6691; S.P. Sathe, "Judicial Activism" (1998) 10 J. Indian School of Political Economy
399-441 (1998); S.P. Sathe, "Political Activism (II): Post-Emergency Judicial Activism: Liberty and Good Governance" (1998) 10 J. Indian School of Political Economy
603-40; Susan D. Susman, "Distant Voices in the Courts of India: Transformation of
Standing in Public Interest Litigation" (1994) 13 Wisconsin Intl L.J. 58-103.
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law. 1 2 In Israel, on the other hand, the personal law area has been an
3
important site of judicial activism.,
Third, each country's personal law system contributes to different
lines of conflict. In Israel, the rabbinical courts lend themselves to
monopolistic control by more traditional elements unrepresentative of
the wider Jewish community and resented and resisted by a segment
of its constituents. In response, the rabbinate and its backers adopt a
more rigidly orthodox stance and resist more adamantly any alteration
of their status vis-6-vis the state.
By contrast, India's state-applied personal law system seems more
resistant to traditionalizing elements and less provocative of conflict, at
least among the Hindu population. The rise of the "second" personal law
adds an element of conflict within the majority Hindu community, but
this type of conflict remains overshadowed by the conflict between the
country's differing religious communities.
A fourth major difference is the salience of the determination of
membership in the majority community. In India, there is a general
willingness on the part of Hindus to be expansive and inclusive; there
is a lack of interest among Hindus in defining the details or boundaries
of membership. In Israel, on the other hand, 'who is a Jew' and who gets
to decide who is a Jew are major foci of polarizing controversy.
This contrast is reflected in a fifth major difference regarding the way
in which the majority religious law is seen to inform the character of the
state. Although India has a sizable Hindu nationalist movement, there
54
is no evident support for the restoration of traditional Hindu law.

152 Indeed, "activism" may be deployed to avoid confronting the tension between personal law and gender equality. A recent example is Githa Hariharanv. Reserve Bank
of India (1999) 2 SCC 228, where the Supreme Court, in the face of palpable
preference for fathers over mothers in a provision of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, concocts an imaginative but implausible reading of the statutory
language to ward off the need to measure the statute against constitutional stand-

ards.
153 Edelman, Courts, Politics, and Culture, supra n. 9, at chap. 3. See also Dotan,
"Judicial Rhetoric, Government Lawyers, and Human Rights", supra n. 150.
154 For a discussion of the failure of early efforts at revival, see Marc Galanter, "The
Aborted Restoration of 'Indigenous' Law in India", in Law and Society in Modern
India.
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Indeed, Hindu nationalists propose abolishing separate personal laws
in favor of a general uniform law in matters relating to the family - and
thus dissolving "Hindu Law" as a living legal category. Although this
position is asserted aggressively towards Muslims, it also amounts to an
assertion that Hindu identity can be vouchsafed through the vehicle of
the Indian state, without specifically embracing the dharmasastraor
empowering its exponents.
In Israel there is certainly disagreement over 'who is a Jew', who
should decide whether or not an individual is a Jew, and how much of
a role Judaism should play in the Israeli state. But there is a general
sentiment among the public that Israel should always remain the
exclusive homeland of the Jewish people, that the state should be
infused with a distinctive Jewish character and that the Jewish law
should be maintained and promoted by the state. As Martin Edelman
puts it, "the controversy is about the way the status quo agreement is
155
implemented, not about the basic arrangement itself".
A final difference relates to the types of human rights and freedoms
Indians and Israelis enjoy vis-&-vis their respective personal law systems. Both personal law systems offer their constituents what we might
call a "comfortable shoe" brand of freedom. Both systems present
citizens with a single, hard-to-alter set of rules that are an expression
of a valued religious identity. For many or most of their constituents,
the opportunity to have these doctrines and principles applied to them
is embraced as valuable in itself. In both India and Israel, substantial
populations uncomplainingly accept this personal law regime as giving
them freedom to live as they wish. But personal law systems also may
offer another sort of freedom, by offering their constituents choices
among alternative sets of rules. For instance, Indians can, in some
circumstances, choose between religious-based marriage law and that
provided by the Special Marriage Act. This "menu" type of freedom is
less available to citizens of Israel, where there is no escape from the
156
legal monopoly of the various religious communities.
Some scholars have proposed that one way to solve the tension
between a system of personal laws and a democracy committed to

155 Edelman, Courts Politics, and Culture, supra n. 9, at 61.
156 Our discussion on freedom draws on Isaiah Berlin's, Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford,
Oxford University Press, 1969) 122-34.
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equality, is to introduce or enlarge the voluntary element in the personal
law.'5 7 But by adding this menu feature the state elevates individual
autonomy over group identity. 5 8 For many Muslims in India and for
Orthodox Jews in Israel expanding or introducing a system of
volunteerism would challenge the commitment to obligatory religious
law as a defining feature of their collective sense of identity. These
groups view mandatory personal law as crucial for maintaining the
identity, solidarity, and continued existence of the community. Thus the
"comfortable shoe" and "menu" freedoms represent incompatible principles of human freedom. For most Indian Muslims and for Orthodox
Jews in Israel, personal law trumps claims based on individual autonomy; for most Hindus and non-Orthodox Jews (each the majority
group in its society), these autonomy claims trump personal law.
We started with the notion that India and Israel represented distinct
styles of administering personal law. We do not wish to suggest that
such styles are unchanging and fated forever to run in parallel without
any convergence. The career of the personal law in our two countries
suggests otherwise. Although secularism, formally enshrined as an
element of the Indian state, has been under attack from many quarters,159 there is at least a slight leaning toward dissolution of the
personal law system in favor of uniform territorial law, together with
a "secularization"or de-sacralization of the law of the largest community, and no indication of any inclination to devolve the administration
of personal law to the religious communities. In Israel, we see movement, fiercely resisted, from administration by religious authorities to
administration by the state and a more pronounced movement toward
more state supervision of what remains within the ambit of the religious
courts (at least the Jewish ones). Like India, Israel seems to be moving
in the direction of secularization or de-sacralization.
157 Kishwar, Religion at the Service, supra n. 53, at 245-46; Guido Tedeschi, Studies in
Israel Law (Jerusalem, Hebrew University Students' Press, 1960) 238-88; T. Mahmood,
"Common Civil Code, Personal Laws and Religious Minorities", in Mohammed Imam's,
ed., Minorities and the Law (Bombay, Tripathi, 1972) 60-65; J.D.M. Derrett, "The
Indian Civil Code or Code of Family Law: Practical Propositions", in N. Khodie, ed.,
Readings in Uniform Civil Code, supra n. 51, at 28-30.
158 Mansfield, "Personal Law v. Uniform Civil Code", at 169.
159 On the recent debate over secularism in India, see the various articles in Part IV of
Rajeev Bhargava, ed., Secularism and its Critics (Delhi, Oxford University Press,
1998); Brenda Cossman and Ratna Kapur, Secularism'sLast Sigh: Hindutva and the
(Mis) Rule of Law (Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1999).
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We may gain some perspective on these shifts from consideration of
India's twin, Pakistan, which started in 1947 with the same personal
law regime as India - indeed with the identical legal and administrative endowment. Pakistan's divergence from India flows from a characteristic that it shares with Israel. Pakistan and Israel are the only
post-colonial new nations that were established to be religious homelands, respectively for the Muslims of the subcontinent 160 and for the
Jews of the world. (In each case less than half of the group actually live
in the homeland). Each nationalist movement put forth claims in the
161
name of a religion that emphasizes the legal ordering of social life.
Yet, in each case the state was founded by secular modernizers and at
first was regarded askance by traditional religious formations. 16 2 In
Israel, the founders reconciled themselves to incorporating religious law
and its traditional expositors in some sectors, but the scope of religious
courts has been narrowed by the state and its courts. In Pakistan,
unlike Israel, we see movement in the opposite direction - from stateadministered personal law towards an expanded guidance of personal
163
law and of public law by traditional religious expositors.
Why has Pakistan moved toward de-secularization and sacralization
of public life, while Israel and India have moved in the opposite direction? The contrast between Israel and Pakistan is stark: In Israel the
majority of Jews are comfortable with modernity and want to confine
religion to a restricted sphere of operation. The minority that wants to
preserve or intensify religious control has a disproportionate say due to
the electoral system in which cohesive minorities can demand concessions as coalition partners. In India, even with a "Hindu nationalist"
government, we see no push for Hinduization of the law; indeed we see
an undiminished willingness to attenuate further the connection of
Hinduism, at least in its dharmasastricsense, with the law. In Pakistan, on the other hand, those who would separate religion from public

160 Lawrence, Shattering the Myth, supran. 54, at 56-64; Rashida Patel, Socio-Economic
PoliticalStatus and Women & Law in Pakistan(Karachi, Faiza Publishers, 1991) 2.
161 See ibid.; also see Rashida Patel, Islamisationof Laws in Pakistan?,(Karachi, Saad
Publishers, 1986) 6-7.
162 See Lawrence, Shattering the Myth, supra n. 54, at 54-64.
163 Patel, Socio-Economic Political Status, supra n. 160, at 99-102; Rashid Ahmed,
"Raise the Crescent" (1998) 161, 49 Far Eastern Economic R. 20-22; "Sharifs Sharia"
(1991) 319 The Economist 33.
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life are a minority; the mainstream of politics has generated mass
support for Islamicization and stifled opposition to it.164 Why does India
resemble Israel rather than Pakistan in turning away from the
sacralization of personal law? Furthermore, how do we explain why the
majority group in Pakistan resembles the insecure minorities we find
in Israel and India? We leave these questions for another day.

164 Ahmed, "Raise the Crescent", supra n. 163, at 20-22; Rashid Ahmed and Shiraz
Sidhva, "Fundamental Pakistan" (1998) 161, 38 Far Eastern Economic R. 20.

